



# From Crisis to Recovery

*Taiz Emergency Food Security Program (TEFP)—Yemen*

## Rapid Assessment Report

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## Executive Summary

In February 2013, a rapid assessment was conducted in Al Mukha, Mawza, and Dhubab Districts in Taiz Governorate to measure the impact of the *Taiz Emergency Food Security Program* (TEFP) at the beneficiary household level and to deepen understanding of livelihoods needs and opportunities in program communities. Implementation began April 1, 2012 in the wake of Arab Spring-inspired political crisis, and the program is scheduled to complete May 31, 2013. TEPF distributes emergency food rations through vouchers to 8,953 households—some 75,000 beneficiaries—which can be redeemed at any of 72 participating vendors. Each monthly voucher can be redeemed for 7 kilograms (kg) of rice, 25 kg of wheat flour, 24 cans of kidney beans, and 1.8 liters of vitamin fortified cooking oil, intended to meet around 30% of their household food needs. By providing food purchased locally, the program promotes economic resilience in crisis-affected areas. This approach to food assistance is known as local and regional procurement (LRP), and it aims to avoid undercutting the local food market and to support food supply flows through established channels. A video highlight of the project can be found at: <http://bit.ly/Y4ltTO>. A photo essay highlighting the project can be found at: <http://bit.ly/Y6ZOve>.

Data on three widely used food security indices shows that TEPF has had the intended impact of significantly increasing food security in the short-term for most beneficiary households. Data also shows, however, that a small percentage of beneficiaries has experienced increased food insecurity since baseline, and Mercy Corps has learned that the vouchers provide a smaller percentage of food needs for many households than was originally calculated.

Food Security Measurements			
	Coping Strategies Index (CSI)	Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS)	Household Hunger Score (HHS)
Average baseline score	80.6	19	5.1
Average endline score	46.4	7.5	2.4
Improvement	57.6%	60.2%	52.8%


These results represent progress on key program targets and will inform the final program evaluation. Measurement of progress towards the remaining targets is ongoing through regular program monitoring, and a final evaluation report will incorporate those findings at the end of the program. Data from focus group discussions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIIs) indicates that although the program has faced significant challenges with targeting of beneficiaries, security, and logistics of setting up the voucher mechanism, these targets are on track. Qualitative feedback showed that the voucher mechanism for delivering food aid was appropriate in this context. Vendors also benefited from participating in the program and many have formed new relationships and are providing new products or services.

### **Livelihoods Findings**

Yemen has undergone dramatic shifts in recent years, and the lives and livelihoods of Yemenis have been affected in unpredictable ways. Political instability, corruption, and insecurity have contributed to a deteriorating economy and poor business enabling environment. Current and accurate livelihoods data in Yemen is hard to come by, especially when looking at the very local level. Recognizing the constraints, as well as the opportunity this assessment presents, livelihoods questions were included in a household survey for this study. Qualitative inquiries also yielded valuable livelihoods findings and context.

The chart of below of prevalent income sources in the program area shows that government social assistance is the most common source of income, while collecting and selling wood for charcoal production is the most common primary source of income among survey respondents. This reflects an alarming situation of dependence on unsustainable livelihoods and suggests

insufficient opportunities to earn a livable income through existing sectors. Fishing, agriculture and livestock, construction, and sales of goods and services (including illegal smuggling) are other leading income-generating activities in TEFP program areas. Livelihoods vary significantly between the three livelihoods zones that make up target districts: coastal, coastal plains, and *wadi* zones.



**Fishing.** There are major constraints and risks to fishing off the coast of Taiz. Dangerous waters in the winter months, theft of boats by Somali and Eritrean pirates, bullying by fishing mafias, and overfishing by international fleets are all difficulties faced by fishermen.

**Sale of goods and services.** This includes a range of small business activity, but qualitative information suggests that a large portion of households claiming this as an income source rely on smuggling. “Importers” increasingly choose the illegal route to avoid paying taxes, recruiting residents in rural Taiz to help move the products through. The port in Al Mukha has fallen into disrepair and is not well-managed.

**Agricultural production.** Onion dominates production, but the market is flooded and prices for onion are low. Some farmers have resorted to random digging for groundwater. Entire areas have completely dried up and given way to desertification. Poor farmers are unable to finance necessary inputs to grow, and poor infrastructure for irrigation and transport are also limiting factors. Levels of land ownership vary from village to village. Some communities have a tradition of better off people lending land to poorer farmers for a fee of 1/5 of the crop produced on the land. The agriculture sector faces distinct challenges and opportunities in the three different livelihoods zones. In the coastal zone there are productive farms of onions, animal fodder, and dates. The coastal plains zone has the most depleted soil and water resources, and agricultural production is minimal. The *wadi* zone is the most productive, and there is widespread cultivation of onion, watermelon, wheat and other crops.

**Agricultural labor.** This is a major source of income, but just 10 years ago the sector provided many more jobs than it does now. Many laborers reported selling wood for charcoal in the dry season to make ends meet, and unemployment in agricultural areas is now very high.

**Gathering and selling wood.** A surprising 18.6% of respondents said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income. The practice has exacerbated desertification, and the

destructive nature of this livelihood activity is a strong indicator that households are becoming more vulnerable and have few options.

**Raising livestock.** The livestock sector had been more vibrant in the recent past. There are still imports of livestock that move through the area from the sea to inland markets. In the *wadi* zone there are many households raising livestock, but animals are underweight.

**Construction.** This is a major source of income for beneficiary households. Most travel to Taiz City or other parts of the governorate for construction jobs.

**Social assistance.** Twenty-five percent of respondents said their household relies on social assistance for income, the most common income source.

Additionally, government salaries, remittances, gathering and selling plastic, sale of fruits and vegetables, donations (including begging), production and sale of qat, sea salt production, and gathering and selling fodder were all reported as sources of income by survey respondents.

### **Recommendations for Future Programming**

Although crises may have been averted for most voucher recipients during the life of the program, few of the contributing factors have improved. Conditional aid through **Vouchers for Work** (VFW) or **Vouchers for Training** (VFT)—to foster sustainable livelihoods, improve household nutrition practices, and protect the health and assets of vulnerable households could be a first step in a transition from relief to recovery to resilience. A second phase voucher program should provide at least 50% of household caloric and micronutrient needs.

A broader **livelihoods strategy** will be important to leverage any momentum created by relief and recovery programs. An accurate understanding of livelihoods zones and their boundaries is important for appropriate livelihoods support and development. **Mapping of livelihoods zones and a deeper and more targeted livelihoods assessment** or sector study would be valuable. A programming mechanism that allows for participatory identification of needs and strengths would help tailor support more appropriately. This study highlights the following opportunities:

- **Village savings and loans (VSL) groups** can build strong social capital. At the district level VSLs can form a Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA). Through the VSLA mechanism VSLs can be connected—in the long-term—to financial institutions as they mature.
- Facilitating access for **fishers groups** to inputs could have huge benefits. Business, safety, and boat maintenance training for fishing groups would complement these activities.
- Awareness raising, training, and civil society strengthening could all work to **curb destructive agricultural practices**.
- Rehabilitation and construction of **irrigation** infrastructure can support production, and road repair and construction could improve **market access** for farmers.
- FAO strongly supports **kitchen gardening** in rural areas. There is a high value export market for Yemeni vegetables to Saudi Arabia, as well as opportunities in larger Taiz markets.
- Future programming can help create **date palm** nurseries, and dates are already grown in seaside areas. Existing wells need rehabilitating, and the establishment of hedgerows as windbreaks and to stop dunes can protect young trees. Improved postharvest handling practices and packaging could add value to date crops.
- Supporting vulnerable households with **small ruminants** has been strongly supported by FAO. Animal diseases are a problem, and vaccination training would be valuable.
- Support for small **sea salt production** facilities that include the addition of iodine is feasible in seaside communities. Production can be increased with water pumps that can allow for year-round salt making. Packaging, labeling, and market linkages could add value to salt sales.

## Background

Like many countries across the Arab world, Yemen has undergone dramatic upheaval over the past two years. Arab Spring-inspired political crisis between pro and anti-government forces in 2011 impacted every citizen. The uprising was particularly strong in Taiz Governorate in the south of the country, and pro- and anti-government forces regularly clashed for nearly 10 months. Yemen is the poorest country in the Middle East, and approximately 17.5% people survive on less than \$1/day, which is a dramatic increase from 5.1% in 2000. On average, 34.8% of the population lives under the national poverty line, with 20.7% in urban areas and 40.1% in rural areas.<sup>1</sup> Contributing to and exacerbated by the crisis, Yemen faces a range of deep, protracted challenges.



2011 protests in Taiz City

The country has experienced increasing weather variability from climate change and recurrent and prolonged drought has severely aggravated an already precarious situation. There is extreme water stress, and groundwater reserves will likely be mostly depleted within two to three decades, even without climate change. This could reduce agricultural output by up to 40%,<sup>2</sup> and the most water insecure areas are also the most food insecure. It is estimated that Sana'a will be the first capital city in the world to run out of water by 2020. Unsafe water and poor sanitation and hygiene pose severe public health

risks and contribute to malnutrition and disease. A dire economic situation has led to destructive land and water use practices, and overdraft of groundwater and deforestation have ushered in widespread desertification.

Significant portions of Yemen's population are politically and economically disempowered. The government announced in August 2011 that unemployment reached 52% for youth—18-26 years old—and there is a “youth bulge” with 65% of the population under 24 years old.<sup>3</sup> Women and girls between the ages of 15-64 make up only 20% of the workforce, and only 3% of businesses are owned by women. Overall adult literacy in 2007 was 59%: 77% for men and 40% for women. Women's inclusion in education, employment, and leadership is consistently low in Yemen.

Separatist fighting in both the South and far North of the country, high-profile assassinations by Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Aden and Sana'a in late 2012, and lack of inclusiveness in the ongoing political transition continue to ignite volatility in Yemen between complex political, tribal, and religious allegiances. Al Houthi Shiite rebels maintain tight control in the North of the country, particularly in Sa'ada, Al-Jawf, and Hajjah Governorates. Some 300,000 people have been displaced and the conflict has exacerbated tensions within tribal groups, resulting in widespread violence throughout the North of Yemen. There is a strong secessionist movement called Al Hirak in the South of Yemen with thousands of supporters. Yemen came out

<sup>1</sup> United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA), *Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2012*

<sup>2</sup> World Bank. *Assessing the Impact of Climate Change and Variability on the Water and Agriculture Sectors, and the Policy Implications*, April 2010.

<sup>3</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-13917706>

of a bloody civil war in 1994, and the North took over the South to create one country. The bitterness of the past is entrenched in throughout the South. Many areas of Yemen are ungoverned and lawless, and consequently there are Islamist groups associated with AQAP operating from these areas, primarily Abyan Governorate. In 2011, an estimated 100,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) fled to neighboring Aden and Lahj due to a military operation seeking to regain control of Abyan. In 2012, the majority of IDPs returned to Abyan, but many struggle to reintegrate and struggle to cope with the loss of assets and livelihoods. The government still does not maintain full control of the area and there are strong internal rivalries for power and resources.

After the Arab-spring uprising, the country avoided a possible civil war through a compromise for a political transition known as the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) initiative. The agreement offered former President Ali Abdullah Saleh domestic immunity from prosecution in exchange for his resignation. Although Saleh stepped down in February 2012, the youth, Al Houthis, and the separatist movement in the South were excluded from the GCC agreement. This lack of inclusiveness and failure to address the root causes of the uprising—chronic poverty and poor governance—means that there remains a strong chance conflict will escalate again.

The uprising led to steep price spikes for basic supplies like food, water, and fuel. Yemen imports 90% of wheat and 100% of rice consumed in the country. This import dependency makes it highly vulnerable to shocks within the international marketplace. Yemen has the second highest rate of chronic malnutrition in the world at 58%. According to the World Food Programme's (WFP) 2012 Comprehensive Food Security Survey, nearly half of Yemen's population is food insecure, and more than half of all Yemeni children are chronically malnourished.<sup>4</sup> Mercy Corps expanded its portfolio in Yemen in 2012 from \$1.2 million to over \$12 million—largely for humanitarian interventions in Taiz Governorate—in an effort to mitigate the impact of the crisis and create positive change. But there has been a breakdown in government control and widespread destruction of key infrastructure like health clinics, roads, schools, and houses. Millions remain affected by loss of basic services, fuel shortages, and large cost-of-living increases that have not subsided, with the poorest households not meeting minimally adequate food needs. Many families remain in a state of food security crisis, with only the provision of humanitarian assistance standing between them and hunger.<sup>5</sup>


Complex and deteriorating economic, environmental, health, governance, and security situations leave many families in an absolute poverty and hunger trap. Today half of Yemen's population is affected by humanitarian crisis, and the country remains gripped by a number of overlapping tensions that increasingly bring the civilian population to the brink of emergency.

**The Program.** Some 45% of the population of Taiz Governorate is food insecure, and more than 11% of children under the age of 5 there are malnourished. In the 2011 political crisis, over one million of Taiz City's residents and those in rural surrounding areas suffered dramatically from instability and conflict. Widespread violence, loss of basic services, fuel shortages, and steep increases in the cost of living pushed already food insecure households in climate and resource-stressed communities into a situation of acute food insecurity and malnutrition. Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rates at 31.7% and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) rates among children under 5 at 9.9%—twice the World Health Organization emergency threshold—were confirmed in Hodeidah Governorate, adjacent to Taiz in December 2011. Rural areas of Hodeidah and Taiz

<sup>4</sup> UNOCHA, *Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2012*

<sup>5</sup> According to an August 2012 joint Integrated Food Insecurity Phase Classification (IPC) analysis. Analysis partners include FAO, WFP, UNICEF, Save the Children, Mercy Corps, Oxfam, and the Government of Yemen.

both include coastal, coastal planes, and *wadi* livelihoods zones<sup>6</sup>, and the alarm was raised that a similar humanitarian crisis existed in Taiz. Both UNICEF and WFP urged Mercy Corps to lead this intervention in Taiz to close the humanitarian gap. A SMART survey<sup>7</sup> was conducted by UNICEF and the Ministry of Health in Taiz in February 2012, which confirmed 73,076 people suffering from Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM) and 11,841 from SAM, the second and fifth highest in the country respectively.



their vouchers at nearby participating vendors for 7 kilograms (kg) of rice, 25 kg of wheat flour, 24 cans of kidney beans, and 1.8 liters of vitamin fortified cooking oil, intended to meet around 30% of their household food needs. By providing vulnerable households with access to food purchased locally, the program promotes economic resilience in crisis-affected areas. The approach to food assistance—known as local and regional procurement (LRP)—avoids undercutting the local food market and supports food supply flows through established channels. Vendors benefit from the increased purchasing power of voucher recipients, and relationships are reinforced at all levels of the food supply chain at the critical point of crisis recovery. TEFP is scheduled to complete emergency assistance in May 2013.

Mercy Corps strives to combine emergency response with activities that build long-term resilience. Operating in Yemen since 2010, Mercy Corps has seen how chronic challenges to livelihoods have been exacerbated by unrest and overlapping tensions, pushing communities into crisis. By providing assistance with food purchased locally, the voucher program supports the nutritional needs of crisis-stricken families while sustaining the food economy and laying the groundwork to persevere in the difficult days ahead. But many of the conditions that made TEFP target communities vulnerable in the first place have not improved, and the perceptions of Mercy Corps field staff, partners, and community leaders are that many TEFP beneficiaries will return to a state of acute food insecurity once they are no longer receiving food vouchers. Regular food price monitoring by Mercy Corps has shown that while prices for basic commodities have subsided since the height of the crisis, some still remain high and economic pressure is still forcing poor households to apply negative coping strategies—including reduced size and number

Mercy Corps' USAID Office of Food for Peace (FFP)-funded *Taiz Emergency Food Aid Program* (TEFP) began implementation May 5, 2012 and is scheduled to complete May 31, 2013. Since June 2012, TEFP has been distributing monthly food vouchers to 8,953 vulnerable households—households including 7 or more occupants, malnourished children, pregnant or nursing women, or people with disabilities or chronic illness—in the rural districts of Al Mukha, Mawza, and Dhubab in Taiz Governorate.

The program targets some 75,000 people, partnering with 72 local vendors. Recipients can redeem

<sup>6</sup> Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET)-defined YE07, YE11, and YE14 livelihood zones  
<sup>7</sup> Standardized Monitoring and Assessment of Relief and Transitions, <http://www.smartmethodology.org/>

of daily meals, fasting, and borrowing or buying food on credit. Poor families continue to rely on dangerous or destructive income-generating activities, like smuggling, child labor, and the sale of assets like livestock.

		January 2011	August 2011	August 2012	January 2013
Commodity	Amount	Average Cost in US Dollars			
Sugar	50 kgs	\$36	\$64	\$41	\$35
Wheat	50 kgs	\$18 - 25	\$41 - 64	\$21	\$21
Vegetable Oil	30 liters	\$25	\$34 - 36	\$45	\$45
Flour	50 kgs	\$17	\$26	\$25	\$27
Rice	45 kgs	\$36 - 54	\$45 - 64	\$45	\$45
Fuel	20 liters	\$7	\$16	\$12	\$12

In an effort to measure the impact of TEFP on household food security and gauge overall effectiveness in meeting its objectives, Mercy Corps conducted a field assessment, collecting data throughout program areas. The findings of the assessment are laid out in this report and are meant to inform a final program evaluation, as well as future program design. Follow on programming may continue to address the acute food insecurity crisis in Taiz through a food vouchers for work mechanism—which would allow the implementation of community regenerative and small infrastructure projects to increase and protect livelihood prospects for increased resilience—or vouchers for training to bring nutrition and hygiene training to the household level. Mercy Corps also hopes to utilize its strong community networks and knowledge to address longer-term livelihoods and resilience needs in future programming. As a result, this assessment collected household livelihoods information. The study also included extensive qualitative inquiries to deepen the understanding of the local relationship between short-crises and resilience and to strengthen accountability to beneficiary communities by including their voices and perceptions on long-term needs.

A video highlight of the project can be found at: <http://bit.ly/Y4ItTO>

A photo essay highlighting the project can be found at: <http://bit.ly/Y6ZOve>

## From the Field



Salem Mohammed Saleh has 3 boys and 3 girls, and he and his family are Mercy Corps voucher recipients. He admits that they are barely able to meet their basic needs in recent years. "Before we were getting the vouchers, we were only eating bread and tea for both breakfast and dinner," he explains. "For lunch we'd have rice and potato, or fish if we could get it." Salem says that the additional food they're getting from the vouchers has made a big difference. "One of my

daughters wasn't eating much. She was tired of the same meal of bread and tea, and she was very thin. But now with the beans we've been getting her appetite is better, and her health is improving."

Fatima Ahmed Saleh Makhrama is a 56-year old widow who lives with her son and daughter. With few options for earning income these days, she'd been sending her son out to sea with local fisherman to earn a little extra as a helper on the boat. On a good day, he would come home with 2 fish for the family. On other days he came home empty handed. Fishing in the red sea is dangerous, as there are often high winds and waves. Death at sea is a common occurrence. Since she's been receiving food vouchers, Fatima's had the means to put her son back in school. "I'm afraid that I won't have any choice but to send him out to sea again once the program finishes," she says.



## Methodology

In February 2013, a rapid assessment was conducted in Al Mukha, Mawza, and Dhubab Districts in Taiz Governorate to measure the impact of the *Taiz Emergency Food Security Program* (TEFP) at the beneficiary household level and to deepen understanding of livelihoods needs and opportunities in program communities.

Comprehensive baseline and endline household surveys were designed to capture the necessary data to calculate three widely used food security indices: the Coping Strategies Index (CSI)<sup>8</sup>, Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS)<sup>9</sup>, and Household Hunger Score (HHS)<sup>10</sup>. The CSI measures what households do when they don't have adequate food or the money to buy it and how frequently they rely on these strategies. The HFIAS measures the impact of the program on households' ability to access food. The HHS consists of the 3 most severe food insecurity experience questions from the HFIAS, and it was developed and validated for cross-cultural use.

Before baseline, common coping behaviors were identified through 8 focus group discussions (FGDs) in target communities—12 participants in each FGD. The severity of each coping strategy was also ranked in the FGDs. These coping strategies were incorporated into a baseline questionnaire for measuring the CSI. The questionnaire was designed to capture both consumption and resource augmentation strategies adapted by households in response to food insecurity. The baseline survey questionnaire was pre-tested with field staff and again with beneficiaries, then revised accordingly. The endline survey questionnaire was created by revising the baseline questionnaire. Some redundant or irrelevant questions were removed, but the questionnaire is otherwise identical. Questions were added to the survey to collect information on household income sources

**Data collection.** The same representative sample of beneficiary households were surveyed at endline from baseline in order to get the most accurate picture possible of the program's impact on household food security. The CSI, HFIAS, and HHS scores from baseline to endline are then compared on a household-by-household basis, and an average score for each index can then be calculated. The sample size was determined by using the online sample size calculator (<http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html>) to ensure a margin of error no larger than 5% and confidence level of 95%. The sample of 381 participants was randomly selected at baseline amongst program beneficiaries throughout the 3 target districts. Willingness and ability of distressed households to take the survey was a factor, however, and the final distribution of respondents was 65 households in Dhubab, 115 households in Mawza, and 201 households in Al Mukha. The endline survey was conducted at the time of voucher distribution with 311 households. The remaining 70 households were not present at the distribution, and the survey was subsequently conducted at community centers in their districts to ensure inclusion of all baseline respondents in the endline survey.

Semi-structured focus group discussions and key informant interviews (KIIs) with community members (including beneficiaries and non-beneficiaries), participating vendors, local community leaders and officials, and other relevant stakeholders were conducted to add important qualitative context to the assessment and subsequent reports. A semi-structured approach allows for the capture of unexpected information, but highly useful context and learning. A total of

<sup>8</sup> [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/PNADS360.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADS360.pdf)

<sup>9</sup> [http://www.fantaproject.org/downloads/pdfs/HFIAS\\_v3\\_Aug07.pdf](http://www.fantaproject.org/downloads/pdfs/HFIAS_v3_Aug07.pdf)

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.fantaproject.org/downloads/pdfs/HHS\\_Indicator\\_Guide\\_Aug2011.pdf](http://www.fantaproject.org/downloads/pdfs/HHS_Indicator_Guide_Aug2011.pdf)

16 FGDs—5 FGDs exclusively with women—and 16 KIIs were conducted. In the course of conducting field data collection photos, videos, and field stories were also captured for the purpose of reporting.

Although FGDs and KIIs were highly fluid and responsive, the following questions served as a guide for the team members leading the discussions:

- *Describe the history of the community. What are the major activities and what do people do here to make a living?*
- *How has the community changed? What was it like 10 years ago; 20 years ago?*
- *What are the major factors changing the community, and what challenges need to be overcome?*
- *What are the strengths and/or constraints of the community to overcome existing challenges?*
- *What will the community be like in 10 years; 20 years?*
- *What was the situation that led to the need for emergency food programs?*
- *Have you seen changes in the community or in your own household as a result of receiving food vouchers?*
- *How can the community/households avoid similar crises in the future?*
- *As far as you know, are the vouchers easy to redeem? Is the experience of voucher recipients with vendors positive?*
- *Are the commodities provided from the vouchers appropriate to local needs? If so, why? If not, what would you change?*
- *What would households or the community have done if they had not participated in the program?*
- *What will happen when this program finishes?*

Field Data Collection—February 2013			
Location of Respondents	Collection Method		
	Household survey	FGD	KII
Al Mukha communities	201	3	2
Dhubab communities	65	1	6
Mawza communities	115	11	3
Other stakeholders	--	1	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>381</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>16</b>

Security precautions were a major factor in determining where and how many FGDs and KIIs could be conducted. Although safer than other Governorates in Yemen, the situation in Taiz is still highly unpredictable. These uncertainties posed significant risks to the research team, particularly non-Yemeni team members. Data collection sessions had to be kept short, and more remote field visits had to be kept to a minimum, affecting the distribution of collection locations.

Data from this assessment will inform the final program evaluation. The CSI and HFIAS scores are key indicators of program impact. Measurement of progress towards the remaining targets set by TEFP is ongoing through regular program monitoring. A final evaluation report will incorporate the findings from this study with the monitoring data at the end of the program.

**Research team.** The assessment design, analysis, and report writing was led by Matt Styslinger (Mercy Corps Food Security Technical Advisor and Leland International Hunger Fellow), with support from Mercy Corps' global Technical Support Unit (TSU): Jon Kurtz (Director of Research and Learning), Greg Scarborough (Senior Advisor for Food Security and Nutrition), and Ruben Grangaard (Research Analyst). Field data collection was led by Matt Styslinger and Martin

Varnie (TEFP Program Manager), with strong support from monitoring and evaluation (M&E) and program staff from Mercy Corps Yemen's Taiz office.

A total of 22 enumerators were utilized to administer household surveys. Enumerators were trained by Matt Styslinger and overseen by M&E staff during data collection to ensure the quality and accuracy of the data.



### From the Field

"Business has increased and I've started stocking new products in my store as a result of the voucher program," says Fadhel Saleh Abdu, a vendor in Aldoosh Village in Dhubab District. At first, Fadhel was reluctant to participate because he was worried that nobody would come to his shop to redeem their vouchers after he'd purchased the necessary commodities. He had to form new relationships with wholesalers in order to meet the demand created by the voucher distributions. Once he saw the increased business coming in, he quickly found new ways to reach new customers. "To increase my competitive edge and convince voucher recipients to use my shop, I've been doing regular deliveries to more remote areas. There's no extra fee for the service, and I'm hoping to continue providing the service even after the voucher program, now that I know the people living in those areas." Since he started accepting Mercy Corps vouchers, Fadhel says he's been able to pay off some of his business debts and have his son treated for an illness, which he was previously unable to afford.

## Findings and Results

The results of data analysis show that the *Taiz Emergency Food Security Program* has significantly contributed to its stated goal of enhancing food security and resilience for vulnerable households in Taiz Governorate through the provision of emergency food rations. Below is a logical framework for the program outlining an overall objective and major activities for achieving it, as well as key targets to be achieved.

TEFP Logical Framework			
<b>Goal:</b> Enhanced food security and resilience to vulnerable households in Taiz Governorate through provision of emergency food rations			
Objective	Key Results	Major Activities	Key Indicators
<b>Objective 1:</b> Increase food security for 50,400 persons in 7,200 vulnerable households in Al Mukha, Mawza, Al Wazi'iyah, and Dhubab Districts of Taiz Governorate through eight months of targeted emergency food rations during political transition	<b>Result 1.1:</b> 7,200 HHs identified that meet the vulnerability and food insecurity criteria  <b>Result 1.2:</b> 7,200 HHs redeem 8 months of commodity vouchers  <b>Result 1.3:</b> 7,200 HHs have increased household food availability	<b>1.1:</b> Identify and target vulnerable households based on established criteria  <b>1.2:</b> Establish commodity voucher mechanism  <b>1.3:</b> Implement commodity distribution to vulnerable households through voucher mechanism  <b>1.4:</b> Monitor market impact in origin and distribution markets  <b>1.5:</b> Monitor and document local food procurement approaches	<b>Indicator 1.1:</b> # households and # of beneficiaries receiving food rations <small>*Data disaggregated by age and gender</small>  <b>Indicator 1.2:</b> % of voucher distributions occurring on time  <b>Indicator 1.3:</b> % households receiving quantity of commodity specified by voucher  <b>Indicator 1.4:</b> Reduction in Coping Strategy Index Scores  <b>Indicator 1.5:</b> % increase in the average food security access scale

Many of the *key results* and *key indicators* are being measured through ongoing program monitoring. Quantitative measurements on these targets will be calculated at the end of the program, while measurements for household food security targets are indicated below. The assessment also yielded a significant amount of qualitative information relevant to each of the key results and indicators, which is laid out here along with additional findings about the voucher approach.

**Result 1.1- 7,200 HHs identified that meet the vulnerability and food insecurity criteria.** FGDs and KIIs with Mercy Corps staff, community leaders and council members, as well as beneficiaries consistently reported that Mercy Corps' targeting of voucher recipients was effective and fair. Some communities had participated in other food assistance programs in recent years, such as World Food Programme food distributions, and there were complaints of chaotic crowds and fighting, as well as targeting that had been manipulated by local elites and authorities. TEFP initially identified beneficiaries using the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) list, a list of Yemeni government assistance recipients. Entire villages were missing from the list, however, and many listed turned out to be sheiks, council members, and local elites when crosschecked by Mercy Corps to make sure they met vulnerability criteria. The SWF list had at least 5,000 names of people who were either deceased or did not exist. Furthermore, the same revelations about the integrity of the SWF list were shared with Mercy Corps by peer agencies and other stakeholders. TEFP instead conducted its own participatory process of identifying beneficiaries, facilitated by local councils and trusted community members. At the village level, Mercy Corps explained the vulnerability criteria and these stakeholders identified the most vulnerable households. Households were spot-checked by Mercy Corps to ensure the criteria were

appropriately met, and a high level of confidence was established that the final beneficiary list was accurate and appropriate. The final number of beneficiary households was 8,953.

One of the benefits of using vouchers to deliver food assistance was assumed to be a more respectful and discreet relationship with beneficiaries than would be the case with commodity distributions. The experience of TEFP, however, was more complicated in this regard. The participatory process of identifying beneficiaries was very public, and there were a lot of open debates and disputes about who was and was not vulnerable. Furthermore, monthly and bi-monthly voucher distributions are open gatherings, and most villagers are aware of who is a recipient of Mercy Corps food assistance. Even so, several beneficiary FGDs spoke of well-organized distributions and their appreciation for the respectful character of Mercy Corps field staff.

TEFP originally proposed to work in one more district in rural Taiz: *Al Wazi'iyah*. Significant time was spent trying to identify appropriate beneficiaries there and form relationships with local point people. On more than one occasion Mercy Corps field staff were stopped by armed people demanding that TEFP target their entire community—in other words every single household. There was also a case of a fight between two sheiks who demanded that their community have more beneficiaries than the other. TEFP targets around 10% of each community. In consultation with the local council and the sheriff of *Al Wazi'iyah* Mercy Corps was advised not to continue operating there, and they could not guarantee field staff's safety. In separate incidences, a World Food Programme project officer was kidnapped for several days and their car stolen, and the Yemeni Red Cross had cars shot at in *Al Wazi'iyah*. It was therefore decided to exclude the district from the voucher program.

**Result 1.2- 7,200 households redeem 8 months of commodity vouchers.** All indications at the time of assessment showed that 8 months of commodity vouchers would be successfully distributed and redeemed by 8,953 households. In order to reduce costs and improve logistical efficiency, TEFP has shifted to bi-monthly voucher distributions, distributing 2 months' worth of commodity vouchers to beneficiaries every other month.



TEFP food ration vouchers

Mercy Corps established a thorough verification system for voucher redemption. Each beneficiary has been issued a Mercy Corps ID, and at voucher distribution recipients need to show their Mercy Corps IDs and a national ID—such as wedding or election IDs. Vendors are also required to check these two forms of ID, as well record the voucher serial number, at the redemption. The vouchers are printed by a company that Mercy Corps has a relationship with in Jordan in order to avoid the possibility of counterfeiting within Yemen. The vouchers are printed on high quality paper, which include watermarks to further reduce the risk of duplication.

Vendors then redeem their vouchers for cash at the post office, where serial numbers are verified. TEFP formed this partnership with the post office for both security reasons and to improve financial compliance and reporting. Some vendors redeem as much as 2 million Yemeni rials (US\$9,302) every two months, and Mercy Corps decided that the logistics and risks of traveling to each of the vendors with cash were too high. Vendors are able to go into the post office on their own time to redeem vouchers for cash. The post office was

well placed to serve this function, as they already provide some banking services—including paying military and other government employees' salaries, money transfers, and savings and current accounts. Additionally, the post office was able to set up software for monitoring and to generate necessary financial reports, something that proved very difficult for vendors in the first few months of the program.

Beneficiaries have the option of redeeming their vouchers for commodities at any of the participating 72 vendors. Many expressed that they enjoyed having vendor options and said that it reduced their wait time and also ensured that they would be able to get the commodities, even if one vendor had run out. Some beneficiaries mentioned that they felt that the vendors were also forced to compete for their business, creating incentive to ensure the quality of the commodities. In more remote villages beneficiaries had fewer options, and in the most remote areas some had to travel significant distances to redeem their vouchers. There were at least a few cases of vendors delivering commodities to remote communities at the time of voucher distribution to increase their competitive edge, however, and several more cases where vendor set up new shops in anticipation of increased business from the voucher program.

Given the challenges of the program area, the voucher system is seen as appropriate by multiple stakeholders—including beneficiaries—and generally viewed as successful. That said there were difficulties and perceived shortfalls of the TEFP voucher mechanism. In the first months of the program, some sheiks in beneficiary communities were taking the vouchers & MC IDs of beneficiaries and trying to redeem them in bulk, hoping to keep a cut for themselves. In another case, a vendor authorized to redeem vouchers at one shop opened up a second shop next to a competitor. The second shop was not approved through Mercy Corps. The tensions between the two shop owners rose quickly, and one of the vendors threatened to kill the other. Perceptions of Mercy Corps staff, as well as feedback from the community and vendors, seem to show that most of such incidents have been picked up on by Mercy Corps monitoring and evaluation staff and the issues ironed out in a satisfactory way for all parties. It also emerged that the targeting of participating vendors—which had a lot to do with willingness to participate—was not well integrated with the targeting of beneficiaries. This may have led to longer than optimal trips to redeem vouchers and transport commodities, as well as a missed opportunity to strengthen relationships between beneficiaries and the vendors that they are likely to buy from in the future.

**Result 1.3- 7200 households have increased household food availability.** Based on the limited governorate-level data available at the beginning of the project, TEFP assumed that households on average were meeting 70% of their monthly food needs, and the vouchers were meant to provide the remaining 30%. But it became clear in the course of the program that the food security situation in the three livelihoods zones where TEFP works is much worse than highland and urban areas of Taiz, and there are large variations in food security within any one district. In some of the coastal plains communities it was found that the most vulnerable households could only meet around 30% of their food needs. Some larger households reported that commodities from the program only lasted 14 days into the month, while other households reported that the supply was sufficient for their household. The four commodities available to beneficiaries from the TEFP vouchers were determined based on their nutritional values and the nutrition gaps in crisis-affected households. With little exception, beneficiaries and other stakeholders reported that these commodities were appropriate for household needs. Many reported that there was also a need to access sugar tea and milk, which are consumed by most households but are not included with the vouchers.

All FGDs and KIIs confirmed that providing commodities—either through vouchers or otherwise—was more appropriate for emergency food assistance than cash, despite any

inefficiencies. First this is due to the issue of qat—a local stimulant widely used by all levels in Yemeni society. Many beneficiaries admitted that if they had received cash, a significant portion would have gone to purchasing qat. Another issue is that many vulnerable households have debts with local elites. If beneficiaries had received cash then their debtors would have demanded payment. Many respondents reported that the Yemeni Social Welfare Fund distributes cash to beneficiaries, and they have seen qat and debt get in the way of food purchases. By providing vouchers that can only be redeemed by the beneficiary for commodities TEFP has ensured that vulnerable households have increased food availability. All beneficiary FGDs reported improvement in household food availability, and many described children's appetites improving as a result of eating balanced meals. Nearly all FGD and KII respondents reported that there had been no significant improvement in the conditions that led to the food security crisis, and they expected to have to resort to desperate measures once the voucher program ended. Many said they would have to send children back to work doing labor for farmers or fishermen in order to make ends meet.

**Indicator 1.1- # of households and # of beneficiaries receiving food rations.** The program initially targeted 7,200 households and 50,400 beneficiaries—at least 24,924 women and 6,747 children under five years old. As of this assessment the number of beneficiary households was 8,953 and over 75,000 people received rations from commodity vouchers. This number far exceeds the targets—and the final numbers, disaggregated by age and gender—will be calculated at the end of the program.

Vouchers can only be redeemed for the food rations specified by the program, and the commodity names and pictures are on the voucher itself. There were no cases reported of beneficiaries not being able to receive the rations. Several beneficiaries complained about the quality of rice they received with the vouchers, adding that they preferred basmati rice over the “Indian” rice they received. Mercy Corps confirmed that there had been an issue in the first months of the program with vendors providing rice of lower quality and utilizing inadequate storage containers, but that through monitoring and working with vendors the appropriate quality standards were met. The program initially provided basmati rice with the vouchers. Feedback from beneficiaries suggested that this was not the preferred variety, and the program switched to a variety known as Indian rice—the most common rice variety consumed in rural Taiz. These experiences may have created a negative perception among some beneficiaries—giving the impression that they were not getting access to the best quality—and there have been requests to switch back to basmati rice. There were a few cases reported where vendors switched out the commodities when the voucher recipients came to redeem. In one instance a vendor ran out of beans and offered peas instead. Reportedly there were other cases where the wrong brand of beans was provided, either because they ran out or at the beneficiary's request. This was not perceived to be a widespread issue, and TEFP's M&E staff was able to catch several of these cases and reinforce the agreement with vendors.

**Indicator 1.2- % of voucher distributions occurring on time.** Food for Peace provided program funding at the end of April 2012 and the TEFP team was selected on May 5. The first distribution to 262 households took place in Dhubab in mid-June. This was a pilot distribution, and it took another six weeks to work out kinks—especially with the post office monitoring system and finalizing the own beneficiary lists—before full-scale distribution began. Additional delays occurred after the first distribution due to security issues faced by the program in Al Wazi'iyah District. Retroactive distribution then took place with two months of vouchers being distributed at one time. This became a permanent feature, and voucher distributions are done every two months instead of every month because it saves human resources, fuel, and other costs. Additionally, vouchers are printed in Jordan and there had been delays getting them to the

Taiz office on time for monthly distributions. Feedback from FGDs and KIIs is that bi-monthly voucher distributions occur on time.

**Indicator 1.3- % households receiving quantity of commodity specified by voucher.** Feedback from Mercy Corps field staff and FGDs and KIIs for this assessment indicates that beneficiaries are able to redeem their vouchers for the appropriate quantity of commodities specified on the voucher itself. There were no reports of vendors shortchanging beneficiaries on commodity quantities. It is important to note, however, that at least some beneficiaries admitted to sharing food items with other vulnerable people who were not targeted by the project, which would affect the commodities available to beneficiary household members.

**Indicator 1.4- Reduction in Coping Strategy Index (CSI) Scores.** The average baseline household CSI score was 80.6, with a high number of families resorting to desperate measures to meet food needs—such as reducing the quality and quantity of food, buying food on credit, and sending children to work for money to buy food. The endline average among the same 381 households was 46.4. This reflects a food security improvement, or a 57.6% reduction in reliance on negative coping strategies. Many families said they no longer relied on adding water to food to stretch the supply, reducing variety of food, and eating low quality, less preferred food. However, 14% of households surveyed showed a CSI score that was worse than their baseline score. In a few cases households scores increased dramatically.

The majority of FGD and KII participants expressed the belief that most vulnerable households would return to acute food insecurity once the program finishes. With food needs met many households have put children back in school, while others have been able to seek much needed medical care. Once they are no longer receiving food vouchers, according to respondents, the will have to pull kids from school again for work and will not be able to pay for clinic visits. Others said they were likely to have to sell household items and their families would experience a high degree of malnutrition. The number of households relying on unsustainable and destructive livelihoods (described later in this report) is an indication that vulnerable households will have trouble coping once the program ends.

**Indicator 1.5- % increase in the average food security access scale.** The average baseline Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) score was 19. The endline average was 7.5, showing a 60.2% improvement in household food security. A reduction in the HFIAS score reflects an increase in the food security access scale, as this indicator refers to. Many families said they no longer had to reduce food variety, eat less preferred food, or rely on smaller meals. However, 7% of households surveyed showed a score that was worse than their baseline score.

Household Hunger Scores (HHS) from baseline averaged at 5.1, and the endline average was 2.4. This reflects an increase in food security.


**Additional findings on vendors and the voucher approach.** TEFP sees the 72 participating small vendors as indirect beneficiaries. Many vendors were reluctant to participate when initially approached, but most who did have reported positive experiences. In the beginning of the program Mercy Corps held meetings with groups of vendors to explain about the voucher mechanism. Most of the attendees were not interested in joining because it was a significant investment on their part to stock the appropriate quantity of commodities, and they did not know Mercy Corps well enough to trust that they would honor the vouchers at the agreed rate. Initially only 8 vendors joined the program, but once the investment pay off after the first distribution many others wanted to participate.

The fixed demand encouraged small vendors to invest. In KIIs vendors described being able to stock new items, as well as higher quantities and better quality of items they were already stocking, as a result of participating in the program. Some formed new relationships with whole sellers, while others strengthened the relationships they already had from the increased business. But some vendors were optimally placed and had the right facilities for storage, and therefore have fared better.

By law in Yemen the program is supposed to cooperate with licensed vendors only. But in reality most vendors do not have a business license—throughout Yemen. Some vendors were unaware of what a business license when first approached by Mercy Corps. The few who had one had an expired license. Mercy Corps has committed to all vendors getting an official business license by the end of the program, and many have already successfully obtained one.

### **Livelihoods Findings**

Yemen has undergone dramatic shifts in recent years, and the lives and livelihoods of Yemenis have been affected in unpredictable ways. Current and accurate livelihoods data is hard to come by, especially when looking at the very local level. Recognizing the constraints, as well as the opportunity this assessment presents, livelihoods questions were added to the household survey. Qualitative inquiries also yielded valuable livelihoods findings and context.



**Fishing.** A total of 57 household survey respondents (15%) said they rely on fishing for income, and 52 of them (13.6% of the total number of respondents) said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income. But there are major constraints to fishing off the coast of Taiz, as well as huge risks, and most fishermen do not earn much. Traditionally fishing is limited to the six months of summer, when seas are calmer and safer. With increasing economic pressure many fishers go out to sea year round, including the winter months when high winds create dangerous conditions at sea. Fishermen sometimes get stuck at sea because their engines get water in them and they don't know about how to siphon the water out or any other engine maintenance. Death of fishers at sea is common. One community leader reported that just a week before interviewing as part of this assessment four fishermen died at sea when their small boat capsized. "If you go to any household around here you will find that at least one person has died in the sea," she declared. Fishing boats are frequently stolen but what the fishermen claim are Somali and Eritrean pirates, fishers get pushed out of the water by fishing "mafias" from Sana'a and other parts of Yemen, and countries such as Egypt send huge fishing fleets to Yemeni waters, depleting stocks. Fuel price spikes and the closure of a local boat-making factory in recent years has meant that costs have reduced the profits for fishers significantly.

**Sale of goods and services.** A total of 63 respondents (16.5%) said their household relies on selling goods and services for income, 52 (13.6% of the total) saying it is their primary source of income. This source of income could include a range of small business activity. But qualitative information suggests that a large portion of these households rely on smuggling. "Importers" increasingly choose the illegal route to avoid paying taxes, recruiting residents in rural Taiz to help move the products through. The port in Al Mukha has fallen into disrepair and is not well-managed by the local government, according to FGD and KII respondents, and this has contributed to the increased smuggling activity in recent years.

**Agricultural production.** A total of 39 respondents (10.2%) said they rely on the production of agriculture for income, with 26 respondents (6.8%) calling it their primary source of income. Ten to twenty years ago, according to respondents, the region was more productive. Weather was more favorable and the ecosystem was greener. Respondents said that it has barely rained in the area for the past seven years. Wheat used to be widely cultivated, while today it is more scarce. Tomato, maize, onion, and watermelon have also traditionally been important crops. These days onion dominates production, as Saudi Arabia imports large quantities of onion from Yemen and farmers can fetch a higher price from Saudi buyers than from local ones. Even so, many farmers reported that the onion market is flooded and they do not get a very high price for their crop during the high season.

Onion is water-intensive, and prolonged drought has left water resources in very short supply. Some farmers have resorted to random digging for groundwater, which is drying up what is left of the accessible aquifers. Entire areas have completely dried up and given way to desertification, and farmers in those areas have lost all productivity. In a village near the village of Alghuraty, FGD participants complained about random digging for water. "The people in Alghuraty are repeating the same mistakes that were made in Alashara (another nearby village). Now people there are struggling to survive there. They will face the same fate in Alghuraty." With overuse of groundwater, reducing rainfall, and increasing wind drying out the soil, many farms will likely lose all productivity in the area if practices are not changed.

Levels of land ownership vary from village to village, but poor farmers consistently reported that they were unable to finance the necessary inputs to grow. While smallholders were able to support themselves with their plots 20 years, few can earn any income from farming these days. As one farmer put it, "without water, our land is totally useless." Most of the land and productive

farms are owned by better off people in the communities. Some communities described a tradition of better off people lending land to poorer farmers for a fee of 1/5 of the crop produced on the land.

The agriculture sector faces distinct challenges and opportunities in the three different livelihoods zones. In the coastal zone there are productive farms of onions and other crops like animal fodder. Date palms are grown in seaside areas and can tolerate water with high levels of salinity. These palms also have several bi-products. The coastal plains zone has the most depleted soil and water resources, and agricultural production is minimal. The *wadi* zone produces a lot of onion and other crops, but overdraft of water and unsustainable deforestation is contributing to declining production. One cluster of *wadi* villages said they had once been on the main route to the main markets farther inland and were more prosperous. But now their roads are in disrepair and a new highway runs through another area that now has better market access than them.

**Agricultural labor.** A total of 58 respondents (15.2%) said that agricultural labor was a source of income. 40 respondents (10.5%) said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income. This is a major livelihood in program areas. FGD and KII respondents reported that agricultural laborers often work on wheat and onion farms in the rainy season, but sell wood for charcoal in the dry season. Just 10 years ago farm and livestock owners provided employment for a large segment of the population in Al Mukha, Dhubab, and Mawza that did not own farms or livestock. Fewer people from the districts migrated to Taiz City and other districts to work. Unemployment is now very high.

**Government salary.** Only 5 respondents (1.3%) earned income from a government salary. The same 5 respondents said this is their *primary* source of income.

**Remittances.** Twelve respondents (3.1%) said their household relies on remittances as a source of income, and half of them (1.6% of the total) said this was their *primary* source of income. At least a few FGD respondents mentioned that young males from their household were sent to Saudi Arabia to find contract labor there. According to them, migrating to Saudi Arabia for jobs is very risky, and Yemenis suffer a high level of discrimination and violence in Saudi Arabia.

**Pension.** Only one respondent said their household relied on a pension for income, and it was not their primary source (accounting for only 10% of HH income).

**Gathering and selling wood.** A total of 90 respondents (23.6%) said they rely on gathering and selling wood for charcoal for income. A surprising 71 respondents (18.6%) said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income. With farm production diminishing, and few alternative options for earning an income, many have resorted to collecting and selling wood for charcoal production. The practice has exacerbated desertification on an already sensitive and climate-stressed landscape. The destructive nature of this livelihood activity—as well as the fact that natural wood is severely limited and harvesting for income is unsustainable—is a strong indicator that households are becoming more vulnerable and have few options.



Charcoal production

A typical household will produce around 10 bags of charcoal per month, with each bag sold at 600 Yemeni rials throughout the nine months. With prices for food rising and prices of charcoal dropping, vulnerable households have to increase the amounts of charcoal they sell to meet food needs. But tree and shrub cover is reducing at an alarming rate in program areas, and these households will likely soon find themselves empty handed.

**Gathering and selling plastic.** A total of 14 respondents (3.6%) said they rely on gathering and selling plastic for income. Only 3 (0.8%) said it is their primary source of income.

**Raising livestock.** A total of 62 respondents (16.2%) said they earn money from livestock, a substantial proportion. Twenty respondents (5.2%) said they rely on livestock as their primary source of income. Many discussants reported that livestock had been a viable source of livelihood in the recent past. Due to drought and environmental degradation, however, livestock numbers have decreased significantly. Residents in the coastal zone said that they used to regularly import animals from Somalia, but it's no longer possible because of the lack of water and fodder. There are still imports of livestock that move through the area, but they are only housed temporarily and are fed from feed sold off of mobile truck sellers—making it inaccessible to poorer households. In the *wadi* zone there are still a lot of households raising livestock. But many animals are underweight and do not sell at high prices.

**Construction.** A total of 89 respondents (23.4%) said their household relies on construction labor for income. 64 respondents (16.8%) said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income. This is a major source of income for beneficiary households, though little of the construction takes place within program districts. Most travel to Taiz City or other parts of the governorate for construction jobs.

**Sale of produce.** Only two respondents (0.5%) said they relied on selling fruits and vegetables for income. One of them said they rely on this activity as their *primary* source of income.

**Social assistance.** A high number of 96 respondents (25.2%) said their household relies on social assistance for income. Only 21 respondents (5.5%) said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income.

**Donations.** A total of 27 respondents (7.1%) said their household relies on donations for income. Six (1.6%) said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income. "Donations" can also mean begging. Admitting to this activity may be sensitive for many respondents, and the actual number could be higher. Many believe that begging for money will increase once food vouchers are no longer available to beneficiary households.

**Production and sale of qat.** Only 3 respondents (0.8%) said their household relies on qat for income, and only 1 of them said it was their primary source. Qat cultivation is a major economic activity in Yemen, but conditions in TEFP program districts are not conducive.

**Sea salt production.** Only 3 respondents (0.8%) said they earned income from sea salt production, all in the coastal zone. Several FGD and KII respondents indicated that there was in fact a lot of sea salt production along the coast between Dhubab and Mokha. But very few people live close enough to the sea to take advantage of this source of livelihood, and income opportunities are minimal. The method of salt production employed is incredibly hard work. Sea salt is produced six months out of the year. The tide is high enough three to four months out of the year to fill up the pits that are dug beside the sea. The water evaporates in the dryer hot



**Sea salt production pits in Al Mukha**

this activity as their primary source of income.

**No income.** Nine respondents (2.4%) reported having no source of income whatsoever.

**Labor worker.** A total of 12 respondents (3.1%) said they earn an income as a 'labor worker,' and 11 (1.6% of the total) said they rely on this activity as their primary source of income. Agricultural labor and construction are included already part of the household survey. These write-in responses are assumed to be casual labor other than farm labor or construction. In the *wadi* zone several FGD and KII respondents said that collecting stones from the nearby mountains and selling them for use in construction was a popular income-generating activity. Contract labor loading and off loading trucks, digging wells, and motorcycle transport services are all income activities that could be characterized as 'labor worker' by respondents. and harvesting and packing onions.

months, leaving behind salt. Producers can only earn about \$4.60 per day according to some respondents. Sea salt production had been profitable in the past. But now the pits need rehabilitating, and the Yemeni government is requiring that iodine be added to the salt to be sold legally in the market—something the current salt producers do not know how to access or apply to the salt.

**Gathering and selling fodder.** A total of 10 respondents (2.6%) said they earn income from gathering and selling livestock fodder. Only 2 respondents (0.5%) said they rely on

## Taiz Governorate's Livelihood Zones

The *Taiz Emergency Food Security Program* operates in a rural area of Taiz across three closely linked livelihood zones. The zones were defined by the Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) several years ago, but more recent determinations are needed. The boundaries of the zones are not easily distinguished, but understanding the different zones is important to understanding the challenges communities face and the opportunities for supporting livelihoods. Less than two decades ago there were more robust livelihoods options throughout the area, but drought and environmental degradation, and economic slowdown, and political crisis have diminished income options. A century ago, the area was famously known for its exports of coffee, spices, and other commodities. The landscape was greener and much more productive and communities were prosperous.



The **coastal livelihood zone** largely depends on fishing, agriculture, and these days smuggling. The port in Al Mukha Town used to be the main economic driver, but it has recently fallen into disrepair, seriously affecting the job market. International goods commonly move through the area from the sea illegally, many wanting to avoid the port and import taxes. Agriculture productivity is limited and declining, due to increasing water scarcity. Fishers face dangerous seas, lack of adequate equipment, and stiff competition with international fleets. Large sections of the coastline in this zone are crowded with pits used to produce sea salt. Livestock are raised, but in limited numbers due to lack of fodder and water.



The **coastal plains livelihood zone**, just inland from the coastal zone, has the harshest conditions of the three zones. The area was once productive farmland, and lines in the sand are all that remain of most crop fields. Overdraft of groundwater and random digging for new wells, along with rampant deforestation for the sale and production of charcoal, has caused serious desertification. Wind is especially strong here and dust storms are a common occurrence. Malnutrition is most severe in this zone, and income options are few. Some smaller-scale crop production and livestock raising still exists, but many rely on income from casual labor in other livelihoods zones in the region.



Further inland and up against the mountainous interior of Taiz is the **Wadi livelihood zone**. *Wadis* are river valley areas that utilize highland runoff for irrigation. Although declining, agriculture is still relatively productive in this zone, and livestock are somewhat more abundant. However, drought and water scarcity are serious issues. Many farmers focus on onion—a water-intensive crop—for export to Saudi Arabia. Poorer households increasingly collect and sell wood, and desertification is creeping in. Some sell stones from the mountains for use in construction, and many households have family members who travel to Taiz city and other areas to work as laborers.

## Recommendations

**Food assistance programming.** Mercy Corps recognizes the need to continue supporting beneficiary communities going forward. Although crises may have been averted for most voucher recipients during the life of the program, few of the contributing factors have improved. Continuing to address food needs by building on the strengths of TEFP could offer opportunities to facilitate a shift from relief to recovery to resilience. Conditional aid through **Vouchers for Work** (VFW) or **Vouchers for Training** (VFT)—to foster sustainable livelihoods, improve household nutrition practices, and protect the health and assets of vulnerable households—could be a first step in the transition. Recognizing the larger-than-expected food gaps of the most vulnerable households, a second phase voucher program should provide at least 50% of the caloric and micronutrient needs of beneficiaries, providing the same four commodities as TEFP.

Household surveys show that the CSI scores for 14% of respondents and the HFIAS scores for 7% of households are higher during the program than at baseline, representing increased food insecurity. An investigation into those cases would be important in understanding either flaws in data collection or factors that are exacerbating the crisis for at least some community members. Additionally, a positive deviance study could be undertaken to identify and map factors and behaviors that contribute to resilience in program areas.

TEFP's process of identifying beneficiaries and crosschecking vulnerability criteria has proven to be a successful model. To avoid tensions in communities and with government and other stakeholders who may consider the Social Welfare Fund (SWF) list a more valid list, Mercy Corps could crosscheck its beneficiary selections with the SWF list during targeting exercises. Specific discrepancies could be outlined and reported back to the donor or shared with other stakeholders as needed to reinforce the rationale for Mercy Corps beneficiary selections.

VFW community **regenerative and small infrastructure projects**—such as creating windbreaks to protect existing agricultural fields from further degradation, and the repair of wells, roads, and irrigation infrastructure—could increase and protect livelihood prospects for resilience. A new program could work with communities to identify priority projects that can be achieved with the unskilled labor. Receiving food rations in exchange for their work would help vulnerable families meet food needs while helping to rebuild rather than deplete community assets.

VFT programming would allow Mercy Corps to offer local women **training on hygiene and nutrition** practices. Many women have had little access to education and are unfamiliar with healthy behaviors such as infant and young child feeding, proper food preparation and storage, and caring and feeding practices during illness. The adoption of these behaviors can greatly increase household health and nutrition, especially of children under the age of five. Providing vouchers for participating in these trainings has the additional advantage of empowering women, who will be bringing extra food resources into the household. When women control resources, they are more likely to expend those resources on the health and wellbeing of the whole family. **Vocational training** for young people and women could also be prudent, as unemployment is widespread and is identified as a primary need by communities. Six-month to one-year trainings could connect to CFT projects or as standalone activities. FGDs and KIIs with community leaders and Mercy Corps staff suggested the options of mechanic or basic office training for youth and handicraft and tailoring training for women. Women's handicraft and tailoring groups could be formed and be provided with business training women and possibly equipment. Linkages and relationships with buyers would also be important.

One potential partner for training activities was interviewed for this assessment, as well as mentioned by other community members who know them. *Al Fanar*—a local non-profit organization—helped Mercy Corps in the TEFP beneficiary targeting process in Al Mukha District and currently partners with a UNICEF-funded education awareness program to try and get kids 6-12 back in school. Although their funding is limited, the organization specializes in awareness raising and education, as well as training for hairstyling and other crafts.

**Promoting livelihoods.** A broader livelihoods strategy will be important to leverage any momentum created by relief and recovery programs. An accurate understanding of livelihoods zones and their boundaries is important for appropriate livelihoods support and development. Any opportunity to precisely **map livelihoods zones** in program areas would help Mercy Corps and other stakeholders better connect relief and recovery efforts to livelihoods development. A deeper, **targeted livelihoods assessment** or sector study would also be valuable. A programming mechanism that allows for participatory identification of needs and strengths would help tailor support more appropriately.

The development of community social capital that supports sustainable livelihoods. Future programming could stimulate and support the formation and training of **village savings and loans (VSL) groups**, which can be strong social capital. Through savings, loaning, and investment would be important functions of the group, if facilitated properly the group can adopt a long-term cooperative and development approach. At the district level VSLs can form a Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA). Through the VSLA mechanism VSLs can be connected—in the long-term—to financial institutions as they mature.

**Fishing.** Large numbers of vulnerable households have fishing skills but lack equipment. Future support could organize fishers into groups and provide them with fishing inputs—include fishing boats, fishing nets, and engines. Each group would need to elect leadership and develop guidelines and regulations governing the management of assets and funds. Small business management training for fishing groups would complement these activities.

Capacity building around **self-management groups** could help fishers reduce risks and losses due to theft and protect themselves against aggressive fishing competitors in the water. Mercy Corps can provide safety and boat engine maintenance training.



Fishing boats in Al Mukha

**Agriculture.** Water scarcity and unsustainable practices are at the root of the difficulties agricultural production faces in Yemen. Awareness raising, agricultural training, and civil society strengthening could all work to **curb destructive practices** like random digging for groundwater and unchecked deforestation. Any program support that can include rehabilitation and construction of irrigation infrastructure and water catchments would be valuable for farming livelihoods. Opportunities exist in the *wadi* zone in particular to **capture and retain surface water** for use in irrigation. Water pumps could distribute water into canals for communal access to water. Road repair and construction could improve access to markets.

FAO strongly supports **kitchen gardening** in rural areas of Yemen. Vegetable crops can be grown on small household plots and can be watered by hand. There may also be opportunities for household level rainwater harvesting for vegetable cultivation. Vegetables have shorter life cycles and can produce several crops per year. There is a high value export market for Yemeni vegetables to Saudi Arabia, as well as opportunities in larger Taiz markets.

Ultimately climate and environment appropriate crop sectors—such as **vegetables and local grains**—and financing and supply chains for them will need to be developed to improve both food security and livelihoods in Taiz. **Dates**, for example, are already being grown in seaside areas. Future programming can help create date palm nurseries. Existing wells near date plots need rehabilitating but seaside groundwater is available—dates can handle some amount of salinity. Establishment of hedgerows as windbreaks and to stop dunes can protect young trees. The introduction of postharvest handling practices and packaging could add value to date crops—such as vacuum-packed dried dates.

Supporting vulnerable households with small ruminants (**Sheep and goats**) has been strongly supported by FAO. Each household could receive five mature small ruminants—four females and one male. **Chickens** would be very important for both meat and eggs and to sell these products for income, and they do not require much food or water. Animal diseases are a problem, and vaccination training would be valuable.

According to locals, **sea salt production** has been occurring in Taiz since the time of the Ottomans, and it was much more profitable not long ago. Program support for small salt production facilities—where salt can be processed for uniformity and iodine can be added—should be feasible. Production can be increased with water pumps that can allow for year-round salt making. Packaging, labeling, and better market linkages could add value to salt sales.



### Qat and livelihoods

Chewing qat—a widely used as a stimulant at all levels of Yemeni society—is a prominent part of daily life. The World Bank referred to Yemen's qat habit as a “national emergency,” and use is growing 10% per year. Men’s work days are often cut short so that extended hours of qat chewing and socializing can ensue. A hunger suppressant hunger, poorer people are known to forgo meals in favor of qat. It’s not uncommon to see children with a cheek full of qat. Abuse has been linked to cancer and kidney problems, and the purchase of qat takes a huge toll on household budgets.

With demand so high, the production of qat can be lucrative. But it is a water-intensive bush and is harsh on soils. With water resources diminishing in Yemen, qat poses a significant threat. Much of the agriculturally productive land is dedicated to qat cultivation in Yemen—a country that imports 90% of the food it consumes. Heavy fertilizer and pesticides are often used in cultivation, a practice that further endangers qat chewers as leaves are rarely washed before chewing.

Awareness about the negative health effects of qat through local health workers and religious leaders is needed in many communities. It is also important to raise awareness at the community level about the risks qat poses to soil and water resources, as well as long-term sustainable livelihoods. Viable livelihood alternatives would be essential in ensuring the success and sustainability of any efforts to shift farmers away from growing qat.

## Annex: Household Survey Questionnaires

### Baseline Survey

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_ . I am conducting a household survey for the Mercy Corps. We are collecting information on households in order to get more information about food security issues.

Your household has been selected for our study. Would it be possible for me to interview the person who is responsible for purchasing and preparing the household's food? This interview will take about 30 minutes.

أقوم بمسح بيانيات الاسر المستهدفة و ذلك لجزء من مرحبا" ، أنا  
مشروع الطوارئ للأمن الغذائي في منظمة مرسى أكور . نحن نسعى للحصول على مزيد من المعلومات حول قضيّة الأمان الغذائي .

وتجهز المواد وقد تم اختيار أسرتك لدراسة . هل من الممكن أن أقابل الشخص المسؤول عن شراء  
الغذائيه لأسره؟ سوف تستغرق المقابلة حوالي 30 دقيقة .

#### General Information

1	Village القرية		2	Mohallah المحلة	
3	District المديرية		4	Sub-district العزلة	
5	Surveyor Name أسم جامع البيانات		6	Date التاريخ	d...../m...../2012
7	Respondent Name أسم المسئل		8	Gender الجنس	<input type="checkbox"/> Male ذكر <input type="checkbox"/> Female أنثى
9	Age العمر		10	Is the respondent household head? هل هو الشخص المسئول عن إدارة شئون المنزل؟	<input type="checkbox"/> Yes نعم <input type="checkbox"/> No لا

#### Household Information

Age Group عمرية	Male ذكر	Female أنثى
6 months to 5 years من 6 اشهر الى 5 سنوات		
5-14 years من 5 الى 14 سنة		
15-24 years من 15 الى 24 سنة		
25-59 years من 25 الى 59 سنة		
60 years and above 60 سنة وما فوق		

## **Household coping strategies**

استراتیجیات الـتکیف الـمنـزلـیـه

a). In the last 30 days, were there any times your household did not have enough food to have NORMAL meals?

خلال الـ 30 أيام الماضية، هل مررت بآوقات قل فيها إلـغـذاـءـ فـيـ مـنـزـلـكـمـ وـلـمـ يـتـوفـرـ مـاـ يـكـفـيـ منـ إـلـغـذاـءـ لـتـنـأـوـلـ الـوجـبـاتـ الـيـومـيـةـ

**(Normal food is when: your HH has 3 meals a day, the meals are not shared: everybody gets equal, the meals are diversified and well balanced**

الغذاء الطبيعي هو : توفر 3 وجبات يومية لافراد الاسرة، وجبات الطعم العام ليست مشتركة : الوجماعي وحصل على قدر متساوٍ . وجبات الطعم العام

(i) Yes نعم (ii) No لا

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b). If the answer is YES, probe and circle all the options in this BOX below that apply to this household, and to determine the frequency, ask how many times in a **week** they used each of the coping strategies.

إذاً كان ت الإجابه بنعم ، أحرص على أجبه جميع الأسئله في جميع الأجزاء المربعة ادنـاه الـتي  
على هذه الأسره ، وتحدى التكرار تنطبق  
أسأل لكم مره في الأسبوع تتحققـقـالاستراتيجيات .

**اہل الیہ اہل رموز اس تخدیم: Mark the responses using the following Frequency codes:**  
**: الاجابات لآخرتیار**

- |   |   |  |
|---|---|--|
| 1. Every day (f=7)<br>the time (نـصـفـ الـأـوقـاتـ) | 2. Most days (f=5)<br>4. Several days (f=1.5) | 3. Half (f=0)<br>5. Never (نـمـاـيـيـ) |
|---|---|--|

#	Type of coping strategy استراتي جية التكيف نوع	Frequency التكرر
1	Reduce health or education expenditure to buy food ت المخصصه للصحة والتعلم مقابل شراء المواد الغذائيه. خفض الإنفاق	_____
2	Skip entire days without eating تمضي ايام كامله بدون تناول أيه وجبه.	_____
3	Taking out children from school اخراج الاطفال من المدارس.	_____
4	Send children to work for food الاطفال الى العمل لتوفير ال غذاء. أرسال	_____
5	Limit portion size at mealtimes تقلييل لكمية الوجبات.	_____
6	Send household members to beg أرسال أفراد الاسره للالقى ايم باعمال التسول والشحاته.	_____
7	Reduce number of meals eaten in a day جبات ال يوميه. تقليل عدد الوجبات	_____
8	Restrict consumption by adults in order for small children to eat تقلييل لكمية استهلاك البالغين للغذاء حتى يتسمى للأطفال فرصة الكبار للحصول على الكميات ال غذائيه الازمة.	_____
9	Feed working members of HH at the expense of non-working Member الافراد اطعام الافراد العاملين في الاسره على حساب الغير عاملين.	_____
10	Consume less variety of food استهلاك انواع اقل من ال غذاء.	_____

#	Type of coping strategy استراتيجية للتكييف نوع	Frequency التكرر
11	Send children to eat with neighbours وا لطعام مع الجيران. أرسال الأطفال ليتناول	
12	Rely on less preferred and less expensive food الاعتماد على الموارد الغذائية الأخرى مرغوبة وأقل كلفة.	
13	Borrow food from a friend or relative استلاف الأكل من صديق أو قريب.	
14	Purchase food on credit شراء الموارد الغذائية بالأجل.	
15	Sold farm implements or fishing implements to purchase food بيع أدوات الزراعة أو البحريّة لشراء الطعام.	
16	Use part of savings to buy food استخدام المدخرات لشراء الطعام.	
17	Sold jewellery or household items to purchase food بيع المجوهرات أو الممتلكات المنزلية لشراء الطعام.	
18	Gather wild food/ Fishing جمع الطعام عن طريق الصيد (البرىء) أو البحري (البحر).	
19	Sold livestock to buy food بيع الماشي لشراء الطعام.	
20	Skip a loan payment التأخر في تسديد الدين.	
21	Leaves added to food to magnify the quantity يتم إضافة أوراق الشجر من أجل زيادة كمية الأكل المتوفرة.	
22	Water added to food in order to supplement the quantity? يتم إضافة الماء لزيادة كمية الأكل المتوفرة.	
23	Any Other (Specify) غير ذلك (حدد)	
24	Any Other (Specify) غير ذلك (حدد)	
25	Any Other (Specify) غير ذلك (حدد)	

**اداة قياس درجة الشحة HFIAS Measurement Tool  
الغذائية:**

(In answering each of the following questions, please respond according to your situation in the past 30days)

**يرجى الإجابة على الأسئلة التالية موضحاً الحاله في الثلاثين الايام السابقة فقط:**

NO	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS	CODE
1	In the past four weeks, did you worry that your household would not have enough food?  خلال الأربعه الأسابيع الماضيه، هل راودك قلق بأن أسرتك لن يتوفّر لها الطعام الكافي؟	0 = No (skip to Q2) 1=Yes نعم	 

1a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادة؟	<p>1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الأحيان (من ثلاث إلى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية)</p> <p>3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً (أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية)</p>	_____
2	In the past four weeks, were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a lack of resources?  خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية، هل كنت نات أو أحد أفراد أسرتك غير قادر على تناول ا ل الطعام المفضل لديك بسبب نقص أو انعدام الموارد (المالية)؟	<p>0 = No (skip to Q3) نعم</p> <p>1=Yes</p>	_____
2a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادة؟	<p>1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الأحيان (من ثلاث إلى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية)</p> <p>3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً (أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة عادةً)</p>	_____
3	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources?  خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية، هل دأبت على تناول أو أحد أفراد أسرتك إلى أن تتحم ل الطعام الذي تناوله بسبب <u>نقص من</u> <u>نقص الموارد</u> (المالية)؟	<p>0 = No (skip to Q2) نعم</p> <p>1=Yes</p>	_____
3a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادة؟	<p>1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) رتين خلال الاربعة الاسبوعات الماضية (مرة أو مرتين)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الأحيان (من ثلاث إلى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة عادةً)</p> <p>3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)</p>	_____

		عادهً ) أكثـر من عـشر مـرات خـلـال الـأربـعـة ابـيـع المـاضـيـة(الـاسـ)	
4	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?  خلـال الـأربـعـة الـاسـابـيـع المـاضـيـة هـل أضـطـرـتـ دـأسـرـتـكـ الـى اـسـتـهـلـكـ طـعـامـ اـنـتـ أوـ أحـدـ أـفـراـ غـيـرـ مـرـغـوبـ فـيـهـ وـذـلـكـ نـتـيـجـةـ عـدـمـ توـفـرـ الـموـارـدـ الـلـازـمـةـ (لـشـرـاءـ انـوـاعـ اـخـرىـ مـنـ الـطـعـامـ).  نـادـرـاـ(مـرـهـ أوـ مـرـتـيـنـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) بعـضـ الـاحـيـانـ (مـنـ ثـلـاثـ الـىـ عـشـرـ مـرـاتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) عـادـهـ ) أـكـثـرـ مـنـ عـشـرـ مـراتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ)	لـاـ (أـنـتـقـلـ لـسـؤـالـ الـخـامـسـ) 0=No (skip to Q2) نعم 1=Yes	
4a	How often did this happen?  كمـ مـرـةـ يـحـدـثـ ذـلـكـ عـادـهـ؟  نـادـرـاـ(مـرـهـ أوـ مـرـتـيـنـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) بعـضـ الـاحـيـانـ (مـنـ ثـلـاثـ الـىـ عـشـرـ مـرـاتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) عـادـهـ ) أـكـثـرـ مـنـ عـشـرـ مـراتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ)	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نـادـرـاـ(مـرـهـ أوـ مـرـتـيـنـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعـضـ الـاحـيـانـ (مـنـ ثـلـاثـ الـىـ عـشـرـ مـرـاتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عـادـهـ ) أـكـثـرـ مـنـ عـشـرـ مـراتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ)	
5	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed because there was not enough food?  خلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ هـلـ أحـدـ أـفـراـدـ أـسـرـتـكـ الـىـ أـضـطـرـتـ اـنـتـ أوـ الـتـقـلـيـلـ مـنـ الـكـمـيـاتـ الـغـذـائـيـةـ الـمـسـتـهـلـكـةـ فـيـ الـوـجـبـةـ الـواـحـدـةـ (عـنـ الـكـمـيـةـ الـلـازـمـةـ) بـسـبـبـ عـدـمـ كـفـايـةـ الـطـعـامـ؟  نـادـرـاـ(مـرـهـ أوـ مـرـتـيـنـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) بعـضـ الـاحـيـانـ (مـنـ ثـلـاثـ الـىـ عـشـرـ مـرـاتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) عـادـهـ ) أـكـثـرـ مـنـ عـشـرـ مـراتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ)	لـاـ (أـنـتـقـلـ لـسـؤـالـ الـخـامـسـ) 0=No (skip to Q2) نعم 1=Yes	
5a	How often did this happen?  كمـ مـرـةـ يـحـدـثـ ذـلـكـ عـادـهـ؟  نـادـرـاـ(مـرـهـ أوـ مـرـتـيـنـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) بعـضـ الـاحـيـانـ (مـنـ ثـلـاثـ الـىـ عـشـرـ مـرـاتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عـادـهـ ) أـكـثـرـ مـنـ عـشـرـ مـراتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ)	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نـادـرـاـ(مـرـهـ أوـ مـرـتـيـنـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعـضـ الـاحـيـانـ (مـنـ ثـلـاثـ الـىـ عـشـرـ مـرـاتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عـادـهـ ) أـكـثـرـ مـنـ عـشـرـ مـراتـ خـلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ)	
6	In the past four weeks, did you or any other household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not enough food?  خلـالـ الـأـرـبـعـةـ الـاسـابـيـعـ المـاضـيـةـ هـلـ أحـدـ أـفـراـدـ أـسـرـتـكـ الـىـ تـقـلـيـلـ عـدـدـ اـنـتـ اوـ	لـاـ (أـنـتـقـلـ لـسـؤـالـ الـخـامـسـ) 0=No (skip to Q2) نعم 1=Yes	

	الوجبات التي يومية بسبب عدم كفاية الطعام؟		
6a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	<p>1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) ه أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع نادرًا (مرة) الماضي(ة)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاث الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضي(ة)</p> <p>3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضي(ة)</p>	_____
7	In the past four weeks, was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع هل انعدام الغذاء عن دالاسرة بسبب شحه او انعدام لـ الطعام؟ الـ موارد المـ خصـ صـ ة لـ حـ صـ وـ لـ عـ	<p>0 = No (skip to Q2) لا ( ) نعم 1=Yes</p>	_____
7a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	<p>1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضي(ة)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاث الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضي(ة)</p> <p>3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضي(ة)</p>	_____
8	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع هل أضطررت انت أو احد افراد اسرتك الى النوم جائعًا بسبب عدم كفاية الطعام؟	<p>0 = No (skip to Q2) لا ( ) الاتاسع نعم 1=Yes</p>	_____
8a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	<p>1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضي(ة)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاث الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضي(ة)</p> <p>3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة</p>	_____

		الاسابي ع الماضي ة)	
9	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go a whole day and night without eating anything because there was not enough food? خلال الاربعة الاسابي ع الماضي ة هل اضطررت انت او أحد أفراد أسرتك لـ تمضية يوم كامل دون تناول أي شيء بسبب عدم وجود الطعام؟	ل) ) أنت هى الاستبان (skip to Q2) 0 = No (skip to Q2) 1=Yes نعم	
9a	How often did this happen? ث ذلك عادةً؟ كم مرة يحد	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابي ع الماضي ة) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاث الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابي ع الماضي ة) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً (أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابي ع الماضي ة)	

Hello, my name is \_\_\_\_\_. I am conducting a household survey for the Mercy Corps. We are collecting data on households in order to get more information about food security issues.

Your household has been selected for our study. Would it be possible for me to interview the person who is responsible for purchasing and preparing the household's food? This interview will take about 30 minutes.

مرحباً، أنا \_\_\_\_\_. أقوم بمسح بيانات الأسر المستهدفة و ذلك كجزء من مشروع الطوارئ للأمن الغذائي في منظمة مرسى كور . نحن نسعى للحصول على وقد تم اختيار أسرتك لدراستنا . هل مزيد من المعلومات حول قضياباً الأمان الغذائي من الممكن أن أقابل الشخص المسؤول عن شراء وتجهيز المواد الغذائية للأسرة ؟ .

تسنغرق المقابلة حوالي 30 دقيقة .

### 1- General Information

1	Village القرية		2	Mohallah المحلة	
3	District المديرية		4	Sub-district العزلة	
5	Surveyor Name اسم جامع البيانات		6	Date التاريخ	d...../m...../year...../12
7	Respondent Name اسم المستجيب		8	Gender الجنس	<input type="checkbox"/> Male <input type="checkbox"/> Female ذكر      انثى
9	Age العمر		10	Total HH members اجمالي عدد أفراد الأسرة	
11	Is the respondent household head? هل هو الشخص المسئول عن إدارة شئون المنزل؟				<input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No نعم      لا

### 2- Household Sources of Income:

مصادر دخل  
الاسرة :

Can you please rank the following sources of income on a descending scale starting from number 1 which signifies the main source of income?

يرجى تحديد مصادر الدخل وترتيبها حسب الاهمية حيث يكون المصدر الرئيسي مصحوب بالرقم 1

Source (المصدر)	Rank	%	Source (المصدر)	Rank	%
-----------------	------	---	-----------------	------	---

Fishing (صيد الاسماك)		Construction (اعمال البناء)	
Sales of goods and services (بيع السلع والخدمات)		Sales of fruits and vegetables (بيع الفواكه والخضروات)	
Agricultural Production (الانتاج الزراعي)		Social Assistance or support (المساعدات الاجتماعية)	
Agricultural Labor (العمل الزراعي)		Donations (التبرعات)	
Government Salary (راتب حكومي)		Production and sale of qat (زراعة وبيع القات)	
Remittances (الحوالات)		Salt Production (انتاج الملح)	
Pension (رواتب التقاعد)		Fodder Gathering (تجمیع الاعشاب او النبات)	
Selling Wood (بيع الخشب)		None (لا شيء)	
Plastic Gathering and Selling (تجمیع وبيع البلاستيك)		Other; please specify (آخر/يرجى التحديد)	
Livestock (المواشي)			

### 3- Household coping strategies

### استراتيجيات التكيف المنزلي

a). In the last 30 days, were there any times your household did not have enough food to have NORMAL meals?

خلال الـ 30 الايام الماضية ، هل مررتم باوقات قل فيها الغذاء في منزلكم ولم يتتوفر ما يكفي من الغذاء لتناول الوجبات اليومية

**(Normal food is when: your HH has 3 meals a day, the meals are not shared: everybody gets equal, the meals are diversified and well-balanced**

الغذاء الطبيعي هو : توفر 3 وجبات يوميه لفراد الاسره، وجبات الطعام ليست مشتركة . الجميع يحصل على قدر متساوي ، وجبات الطعام متنوعه ومتوازن.

(i) Yes      نعم      (ii) No      لا

b). If the answer is YES, probe and circle all the options in this BOX below that apply to this household, and to determine the frequency, ask how many times in a week they used each of the coping strategies.

إذا كانت الإجابة بنعم ، أحرص على أجابه جميع الأسئلة في جميع الخيارات في المربعات أدناه التي تنطبق على هذه الأسرة ، ولتحديد التكرار اسأل كم مره في الأسبوع تتحقق الاستراتيجيات .

**Mark the responses using the following Frequency codes:**

استخدم الرموز التالية لاختيار الأجابات :

- |                                  |                                |                                      |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|--------------------------------------|
| 1. Every day (f=7) يومياً        | 2. Most days (f=5) أكثر الأيام | 3. Half the time (f=3.5) نصف الاوائل |
| 4. Several days (f=1.5) عدة أيام | 5. Never (f=0) نهائياً         |                                      |

#	Type of coping strategy	نوع استراتيجية التكيف	Frequency التكرر
1	Reduce health or education expenditure to buy food	خفض النفقات المخصصة للصحة و التعليم مقابل شراء المواد الغذائية.	____
2	Skip entire days without eating	تمضية ايام كاملة بدون تناول أية وجبة.	____
3	Send children to work for food	أرسال الاطفال الى العمل لتوفير الغذاء.	____
4	Limit portion size at mealtimes	تقليل كمية الوجبات.	____
5	Send household members to beg	أرسال أفراد الاسرة للقيام باعمال التسول و الشحادة.	____
6	Reduce number of meals eaten in a day	تقليل عدد الوجبات اليومية.	____
7	Restrict consumption by adults in order for small children to eat	تقليل كمية استهلاك البالغين للغذاء حتى يتسعى للاطفال فرصة اكبر للحصول على الكميات الغذائية الازمة.	____
8	Feed working members of HH at the expense of non-working Member	أطعام الافراد العاملين في الاسرة على حساب الافراد الغير عاملين.	____
9	Consume less variety of food	استهلاك انواع اقل من الغذاء.	____
10	Send children to eat with neighbours	أرسال الاطفال ليتناولوا الطعام مع الجيران.	____
11	Rely on less preferred and less expensive food	الاعتماد على المواد الغذائية الغير مرغوبة و الاقل كلفة.	____
12	Borrow food from a friend or relative	استلاف الاكل من صديق او قريب.	____
13	Purchase food on credit	شراء المواد الغذائية بالاجل.	____
14	Sold livestock to buy food	بيع الماشي لشراء الغذاء.	____
15	Skip a loan payment	التأخير في تسديد الديون.	____
16	Water added to food in order to supplement the quantity	يتم اضافة الماء لزيادة كمية الأكل المتوفرة.	____
17	Any Other (Specify)	غير ذلك (حدد)	____
18	Any Other (Specify)	غير ذلك (حدد)	____
19	Any Other (Specify)	غير ذلك (حدد)	____
20	Any Other (Specify)	غير ذلك (حدد)	____

اداة قياس درجة الشحة الغذائية : Household Food Insecurity Access Scale (HFIAS) Measurement Tool

(In answering each of the following questions, please respond according to your situation in the **past 30days**)

**يرجى الاجابة على الاسئلة التالية موضحا الحالة في الثلاثين الايام السابقة فقط:**

NO	QUESTION	RESPONSE OPTIONS	CODE
1	In the past four weeks, did you worry that your household would not have enough food? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية، هل راودك قلق بأن أسرتك لن يتوفّر لها الطعام الكافي؟	لا ( انتقل لسؤال Q2 ) نادرأ (مره أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) نعم 1=Yes	_____
1a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرأ (مره أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادهً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)	_____
2	In the past four weeks, were you or any household member not able to eat the kinds of foods you preferred because of a lack of resources? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية، هل كنت انت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك غير قادر على تناول الطعام المفضل لديكم بسبب نقص او انعدام الموارد (المالية)؟	لا ( انتقل لسؤال Q3 ) نادرأ (مره أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) نعم 1=Yes	_____
2a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرأ (مره أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادهً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)	_____
3	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat a limited variety of foods due to a lack of resources? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية، هل أضطررت انت أو أحد أفراد أسرتك إلى أن تحد من <u>أنواع</u> الطعام الذي تتناولونه بسبب نقص الموارد (المالية)؟	لا ( انتقل لسؤال Q2 ) نادرأ (مره أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) نعم 1=Yes	_____
3a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرأ (مره أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks)	_____

		<p>بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)      3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)</p> <p>عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)</p>	
4	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat some foods that you really did not want to eat because of a lack of resources to obtain other types of food?  خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية هل أضطررت انت أو أحد افراد اسرتك الى استهلاك طعام غير مرغوب فيه وذلك نتيجة عدم توفر الموارد الازمة (الشراء انواع اخرى من الطعام) .	<p>لا ( انتقل لسؤال Q2 )      0 = No (skip to Q2)      الخامس      نعم      1=Yes</p>	_____
4a	How often did this happen?  كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	<p>نادرأ (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)      1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks)</p> <p>بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)      3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)</p> <p>عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)</p>	_____
5	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member have to eat a smaller meal than you felt you needed because there was not enough food?  خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية، هل أضطررت انت أو احد افراد اسرتك الى التقليل من الكميات الغذائية المستهلكة في الوجبة الواحدة (عن الكمية الازمة) بسبب عدم كفاية الطعام؟	<p>لا ( انتقل لسؤال Q2 )      0 = No (skip to Q2)      السادس      نعم      1=Yes</p>	_____
5a	How often did this happen?  كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	<p>نادرأ (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)      1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks)</p> <p>2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks)</p> <p>بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)      3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks)</p> <p>عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)</p>	_____
6	In the past four weeks, did you or any other household member have to eat fewer meals in a day because there was not enough food?	<p>لا ( انتقل لسؤال Q2 )      0 = No (skip to Q2)      السابع      نعم      1=Yes</p>	_____

	خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية هل أضطررت انت او أحد أفراد أسرتك الى تقليل عدد الوجبات اليومية بسبب عدم كفاية الطعام؟		
6a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)	_____
7	In the past four weeks, was there ever no food to eat of any kind in your household because of lack of resources to get food? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية هل انعدم الغذاء عند الاسرة بسبب شحة او انعدام الموارد المخصصة للحصول على الطعام؟	0 = No (skip to Q2) (الثامن) نعم 1=Yes	_____
7a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)	_____
8	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go to sleep at night hungry because there was not enough food? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية، هل أضطررت انت او احد افراد أسرتك النوم جائعاً بسبب عدم كفاية الطعام؟	0 = No (skip to Q2) (التاسع) نعم 1=Yes	_____
8a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادةً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)	_____
9	In the past four weeks, did you or any household member go a whole day and night	0 = No (skip to Q2) (الاستبيان)	_____

	without eating anything because there was not enough food? خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية هل أضطررت انت او أحد افراد اسرتك لتمضية يوم كامل دون تناول أي شيء بسبب عدم وجود الطعام؟	1=Yes      نعم	
9a	How often did this happen? كم مرة يحدث ذلك عادةً؟	1 = Rarely (once or twice in the past four weeks) نادرًا (مرة أو مرتين خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 2 = Sometimes (three to ten times in the past four weeks) بعض الاحيان (من ثلاثة الى عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية) 3 = Often (more than ten times in the past four weeks) عادهً ( أكثر من عشر مرات خلال الاربعة الاسابيع الماضية)	_____

Observation or Comments: \_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

## 5- Household Survey Questions (اسئلة خاصة بالأسرة)

- a- What was the primary factor you considered when choosing the vendor where you redeemed your voucher?

ما هو العامل الرئيسي الذي يتم اعتباره عند اختيار التاجر وقت استخدام القسائم؟

Proximity (القرب الجغرافي)

Reputation of vendor (سمعة التاجر)

Relationship to vendor (العلاقة الشخصية مع التاجر)

Additional incentives (free items) (حوافز)  
اخرى مثل تقديم سلع مجانية

Quality of goods (جودة السلع)

Vendor requested their business (قام التاجر بطلبك للتعامل معه)

Provision of service (قيام التاجر بتقديم خدمات)

Local council recommended (قام احد اعضاء مجلس المحلي باقتراح التعامل مع هذا التاجر)

- b- Did you redeem the voucher yourself at the vendor?

هل قمت انت شخصيا بصرف القسائم عند التاجر؟

Yes (نعم) \_\_\_\_\_

No (لا) \_\_\_\_\_

c- Did you receive the commodities you were supposed to receive?

هل استلمت السلع التي من المفترض استلامها؟

Yes (نعم) \_\_\_\_\_

No (لا) \_\_\_\_\_

d- Was the quality of the commodities what you expected?

هل كانت جودة السلع الغذائية التي استلمتها كما توقعت؟

Yes (نعم) \_\_\_\_\_

No (لا) \_\_\_\_\_

e- Are the food commodities included with your vouchers appropriate to your needs?

هل السلع الغذائية التي يتم استلامها عن طريق القسائم تلائم احتياجاتك؟

Yes (نعم) \_\_\_\_\_

No (لا) \_\_\_\_\_

f- Would you have chosen these items?

هل كنت ستقوم باختيار هذه السلع؟

Yes (نعم) \_\_\_\_\_

No (لا) \_\_\_\_\_